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Abstract During the 24 years that have passed since the Maastricht Treaty,
there has been unprecedented progress in both the deepening and the
widening of the EU. The European party federations, however, have not kept
pace. This has created an asymmetry between the deepening of integration in
the EU and its politically miniscule European political parties. There are several
issues that need to be addressed. Doing so might improve the situation in the
medium term.
Keywords European parties  Europarties  European elections  European
institutions
Truly transnational European political parties and political foundations are key to articulating the voices
of the citizens at European level. Can the Europarties really fulfil such a role?
J. M. D. Barroso (2012)
Introduction
The title of this article has positive connotations. It infers that European parties
are doing very well and, by taking a few fresh ideas into the 2019 European
elections, will be able to do even better. This article will present the current
situation of the European political parties and assess the main areas in which
improvements can be made to further integration. It is not surprising that this is
one of those topics on which researchers have widely divergent opinions.
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Do we really need parties in the EU?
The EU has evolved into a fully-fledged political system with public opinion,
institutions, regulation, and ordinary and extraordinary decision-making proce-
dures. It deals with critical issues, not always visible to the majority of the
citizens. These include areas such as agricultural policy, regional development
funding instruments, monetary policy, economic policy coordination, the
regulation of the internal market and the establishment of the rules governing
trade with the rest of the world, among others. Although today’s EU is the
product of a gradual evolution from the original treaties of the 1950s, much of its
current structure is the result of the Maastricht Treaty. The last five years and the
enduring financial and sovereign debt crises in the eurozone have further
advanced European integration, through the introduction of new institutions
and policies to address the design limitations of the monetary union (Sklias and
Maris 2013).
The history of the European political parties and of the pro-European
movement are mutually bound together (Pridham and Pridham 1981). After
several years of sluggish progress on integration in the 1960s due to French
reluctance, the 1970s saw significant steps being taken in the European project
through the preparation for and introduction of direct elections to the European
Parliament (EP). The commencement of the preparatory steps for these elections
gave impetus to the creation of European federations.
Each European party has its own history. Christian Democracy was the leading
post-war political movement. Inspired by federalist and pro-integration ideals, it
gave birth to the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1976 (Kalyvas 1995). Social
Democracy originated from the Socialist International and, despite early
reluctance regarding integration, produced the Confederation of the Socialist
Parties of the European Community in 1974 (Moschonas 2002). Finally, the
international liberal movement created the European Liberal Democrats, also in
1976.
The 1990s brought renewed optimism regarding the European parties, which
flourished after the inclusion of Article 138a in the Maastricht Treaty (Hix and
Lord 1997), and again after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the
Treaty of Nice (2000). The implementation of the ‘Party regulation’ in 2004 gave
impetus to the creation of new Europarties, mainly by Eurosceptic forces, as it set
down the criteria that had to be met for these organisations to be recognised
and subsequently funded. Despite the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in
2007 and ratified in 2009, provided space for more integration, the ongoing crisis
has pushed the institutional design of the EU in search of a new equilibrium.
Diachronically, the EU, through enlargement and deepening, has been
completely overhauled. Today, the Union of 28 member states, compared to
the Union of 9 in the mid-1970s, has institutions and bodies which are much
larger and thus require more coordination. On this basis, the answer to the
question is yes, political parties on the European level are needed, at least more
so than in the past.
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The institutional asymmetry
The discussion about the contribution and role of the existing European parties
is ongoing; however, the majority of reviewers are not enthusiastic about their
performance (Bartolini 2012; Priestly 2011; Van Hecke 2010; Peglis 2011a;
Johansson 2009; Hanley 2008; Mair 2006; Hix 2007; Raunio 2006). This author’s
view is that, taking into consideration their historical path of development and
despite the huge steps taken towards integration in several policy domains by
the EU, the European political parties have not followed a similar path of
development. There is an asymmetry between the development of the EU and
that of the European parties, which still operate under conditions that were
more relevant to the earlier stages of European integration. Two indicators of
this will be explored below: institutional impact and public reference to the
Europarties.
The presence of the three oldest party groups in the core institutions, and the
impact that they have on the decision-making processes of the EU, varies widely.
The European parties have a proven record of working well in the EP (Kreppel
2002), with their success lying in the formal character of their cooperation in
organised groups. The European party groups have institutionalised their roles
gradually since 1953 and the origins of the EP, in parallel with its growth in size
and, most importantly, in competences. The same cannot be said of their roles in
the other major institutions: the Commission, the Council and the European
Council. The Council of the European Union and the European Council are key
institutions in the EU’s decision-making process. European party activity is
observed in these institutions, but it has not been formalised. Tallberg and
Johansson (2008, 16) note, ‘[n]egotiations along party divides are relatively rare
in the European Council, where issue-specific, interest-based coalitions instead
constitute the most prevalent form of actor alignment.’ In contrast, of the EPP’s
pre–European Council meetings, Jansen and Van Hecke (2011, 151) observe:
‘These meetings also sometimes afforded an insight into the strengths and
weaknesses of their own countries’ negotiating positions, which was especially
useful to members of the European Council. In any event, both government
leaders and opposition leaders benefited from exchanges at the EPP Summit.’
The key characteristic here is the ‘informal character’ of the activities of the
bigger European parties, which take place in ministerial meetings for several
portfolios and in council of ministers and summit meetings prior to the
European Council at the level of affiliated party leaders and heads of state. These
meetings have a long history, dating back to the 1970s for the party summits
and the 1980s for the ministerial meetings. However, little has changed in these
bodies in recent decades as far as the content and contribution to the decision-
making process is concerned. What they mainly provide is a space for additional
consultations among the affiliated officers of the respective European party prior
to the beginning of the normal session of the Council or the European Council.
However, in the ordinary decision-making processes of these institutions
ideological affiliation is not the key factor. National agendas prevail and
coalition building is based on converging interests among different member
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states. In general there is little empirical evidence regarding the contribution of
these meetings to the decision-making process of the EU and virtually no
research has been carried out into the matter. The minutes of these meetings are
not public and this might be one reason why little is known about their role.
However, the three largest European parties, which account for the majority of
the representatives in the Council and the European Council, self-define their
presence in these institutions as a ‘network’, rather than a party. There is no
reference to such meetings having any formal role in the decision-making
process.
The presence and the activities of the European parties are less visible in the
European Commission, where there is also a lack of empirical evidence as to the
depth of the work being performed. Affiliated commissioners coordinate their
role with their respective European party. This is done mainly in a ‘business-as-
usual’ format, through the attendance of the affiliated commissioners at the
most important Europarty organs, such as ministerial meetings and pre-summit
leaders meetings. Often termed the ‘European government’, the Commission,
Council and European Council have been transformed since the 1970s. From 9
members in the late 1970s for the Council and the European Council and 13
commissioners, today each institution has 28 members, increasing the need for
coordination. Despite their diverse presence in the Union’s core institutions, the
European parties’ impact on the process of decision-making across them, albeit
visible, could be improved substantially. In spite of the gradual development of
the EU since the 1950s there has not been a parallel development in the
programme content and processes of the European party groups. Member
states are still the key players today, promoting their own interests in the
interinstitutional processes of legislation and policy implementation. The
ongoing financial crisis has strengthened intergovernmentalism.
The second issue is the absence of any public reference to the Europarties.
Even after the successful introduction of the Lisbon Treaty clause regarding the
nomination of the president of the European Commission, from the results of
the 2014 European elections it does not seem as if the European parties have
improved their political footprint among the European electorate, aside from
during the few weeks directly before the elections. This is despite the fact that
the political agenda in all the member states has been dramatically Euro-
peanised. The EU is on the news every day as a result of the wide variety of
political issues that inspire reaction on the European level. This reaction though
is mainly driven by the member states at the intergovernmental level, rather
than by the European parties. As a result, last year’s European elections were not
affected by this profound Europeanisation of political agendas. European voters
still perceive the European elections as national elections of secondary
importance (Reif and Schmitt 1980), mainly because, contrary to national
elections, they do not produce a tangible political outcome. The day after the
European elections nothing is expected of the European parties in terms of
policy implementation or governance in Europe. The above comments
regarding the status quo of the European parties should not be received as
pessimism regarding their role. On the contrary, the size, structure and policy
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content of the EU today is such that only through an increased and more
formalised role for the European political parties can we expect the work and the
decisions taken to become more efficient and more democratic. The formali-
sation of the horizontal work of the European parties in the decision-making
processes and institutions of the EU will contribute in the medium term to a
better functioning Union. With this in mind, outlined below are four practical
ideas to increase the output of the European parties and improve the
functioning of the EU. Only the last proposal requires a treaty change.
Europarties need to strengthen their programmatic framework
The first implementation, in 2014, of the nomination of a presidential candidate
for the Commission by the European parties was relatively successful, despite
the fact that it could already have been implemented in the 2009 European
elections. The Lisbon Treaty was agreed and signed in December 2007, one and
a half years before the 2009 European elections. Its ratification though was slow
and stressful and was not concluded until December 2009. Technically,
therefore, it was not in effect during the 2009 European elections. However,
the clause governing the public appointment of a candidate for the Commission
presidency could be exercised by European parties even in the pre-Lisbon but
towards-Lisbon status quo. The European Council would have been uncomfort-
able if it had not ‘take[n] into account the elections to the European Parliament’
(Peglis 2011a). The EPP’s decision to back Barroso for a second term1 was made
in the pre-Lisbon institutional and political context. Even so, neither the
European socialists (Party of European Socialists/Socialists and Democrats) nor
the liberals (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) were able to reach a
consensus over a candidate.
It is, therefore, necessary to take the next step of strengthening the content of
the nomination—the policy programme—in readiness for the 2019 European
elections. To achieve this, the European parties could internally contemplate a
tighter procedure and timeline that aims to coordinate the policies of the
national member parties, the European party, the party group in the EP and,
ultimately, the candidate president of the Commission into one single
programme for the next five years. As an example, in the run up to the 2014
European elections the EPP adopted the ‘Action Programme 2014–2019’, and
held a final round of debate and a vote in the plenary session of the EPP
Congress in Dublin in March 2014. The EPP Group participated to an extent in
the several months of preparation of this document by the relevant EPP working
group. Although the document was endorsed after the Congress2 by the EPP
Group, in autumn 2014 the new EPP Group adopted the ‘A Reform Agenda for
Europe’s Future - EPP Group Priorities 2014–2019’ document, published in
November 2014. This document should have been a development of the Action
1 With official press releases following EPP Summits on 20 March (EPP 2009a) and 19 June 2009 (EPP
2009b).
2 It was not published, even on the EPP Group’s website.
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Programme adopted by the EPP Congress, but it is not. In the two months of
campaigning, the EPP candidate for Commission president, Jean-Claude Junker,
endorsed the EPP Action Programme and actually elaborated on certain
chapters such as the energy union, the digital agenda and the investment plan,
and added additional catchy proposals to build publicity. However, since his
election as president of the Commission, the implementation of this programme
has been enriched by the agendas of the other members of the European
Commission. This is despite the fact that the role of the Commission president
has been strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty: the president is now the agenda-
setter for the European Commission and not just first among equals. This change
should facilitate the implementation of the agenda that has been presented to
the public and provide the basis for increasing the party’s accountability. This is a
good reason to encourage tighter implementation of the European party
programme, updated over time, and increased commitment and active
participation from all the relevant parties. Therefore, it is clear that this first
implementation of the election of the Commission president based on the
political content of the candidates’ programmes, similarly to how this is done at
the national level, can be improved in the future.
Europarties should contemplate the introduction of the role of ‘chief whip’
to improve interinstitutional coordination
European parties need to introduce mechanisms that follow the everyday
decision-making process of the Union to make sure that their affiliated
groups and members in the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the
European Council have as uniform a position as possible and can maximise
their impact on the output of the EU. The balance of power between the
members of the Commission and the national ministers, not to mention
prime ministers, participating in the Council of Ministers, does not favour the
European parties, which do not have any formal mandate to provide a ‘chief
whip’ in the core institutions. The term ‘chief whip’ refers to a mechanism for
each European party that would ensure that their representatives in the
European Commission, the Council and the European Council keep to their
party’s positions on different issues. The balance between ‘party discipline’
and representing national interests is a delicate one, but wherever European
parties consolidate their positions on different issues, these positions should
be implemented across the European institutions by their network of officers.
The effectiveness of the chief whip, even at the national level, is not based
upon any formal authority among, for instance, members of parliament. In
the same way, at the European level such a role would reinforce the depth of
the work and coordination efforts that each European party and its national
members have to put in to affect the decision-making process. It would
reinforce the strength of the party and ultimately ensure that it was more
coherent in terms of policymaking. The coordination of the European party
representatives in the different institutions is a key factor in increasing
efficiency due to the interinstitutional nature of the EU’s decision-making
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process. Being successful in the EP and getting a policy paper voted through
means little if this success is not endorsed by the Council and the
Commission.
Europarties should talk to the people
Since their beginnings, Europarties have had a proven record in creating political
documents. However, today they need to evolve this ‘talent’ by developing new
policy ideas that will build up their public profiles. The documents of the
Europarties usually score highly when bridging the gap between the different
views of the member parties but score poorly with regard to putting forward
new ideas on the European level, where their competences lie. New policy ideas
usually come from member states or the core institutions. Through fresh policy
proposals the parties could develop profiles that are of interest to the public.
Such policies might include, for example, a proposal for a European supple-
mentary pension that would introduce voluntary contributions to efficiently
build up a new pension system, or the introduction of the ‘European company’,
which would enjoy some benefits vis-a`-vis nationally registered companies. In
general, European parties should look into taking new ideas that affect ordinary
people to the European level. In fact European parties do contemplate positions
through resolutions and policy papers but knowledge of this rarely reaches the
broader public. Policy initiatives today in the EU are credited to the Commission
or Council members rather than to the European parties.
Changing how the commissioners are nominated
After the 2019 European elections, the European Council will propose the next
president of the Commission after taking into account the candidate proposed
by the winning European party. The members of the Commission, however, will
be appointed by the Council in accordance with the older procedure outlined in
Article 17 Paragraph 7 of the Treaty of the European Union. This means that the
European elections will have no effect on these appointments. This is explained
by the fact that historically the European elections were not associated with the
appointment of the European Commission, whose appointment was a compe-
tence of the national governments (Wonka 2008). The proposal is that the
authority to appoint a member of the Commission be shifted from the
government of the day to the national party that ranks first in the European
elections (Peglis 2011a; b). This would strengthen the European dimension of the
elections, as the citizens would take this into account more than the election of
the president of the Commission, as it would determine who they send to
Brussels to become their European commissioner.
The aim of this proposal is to strengthen the association of the European
elections not just with the election of the members of the EP and the
appointment of the president of the European Commission, but with the
appointment of the designated commissioner from each country. National
parties would put forward their proposed candidate for the College of the
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Commission as part of their campaign and would appeal to the electorate on
this basis. The party that received the highest number of votes would be eligible
to appoint its candidate for the Commission, rather than this being a
competence of the government of the day. The pattern of implementation
could be similar to the clause in the Lisbon Treaty for the appointment of the
president of the European Commission. The legal provision could refer to the
nomination of the commissioner designate from each country ‘taking into
account the results of the European elections’. Such a legal provision, at a Treaty
level, addresses the constitutional and legal barriers that would arise at the
national level. The clause would be more political as there could be no legal or
even a constitutional amendment at the national level, thus ensuring that only
the government of the day would have the authority to nominate a candidate
for Commissioner. Member countries would be invited to follow its provisions. If
they did not they would risk their candidate commissioner not being approved.
The EP has a proven record on this front. Equally, if each national party were to
name its candidate for commissioner, people would be less likely to vote based
on national or reactionary criteria as, apart from electing the members of the EP,
their vote would also decide who was appointed to the European Commission.
In contrast to the European institutions, European elections have evolved to
become an incubator for populist political parties. The combination of a national
ballot in the era of nationwide media and the absence of any actual
consequences on the day after the election, has relaxed the voting criteria,
which is the opposite of what is needed at the European level. Populist or single-
issue parties that have little to say about the real issues in Europe have been
strengthened as a result. Populist parties have flourished not only due to their
anti-systemic nature and media tactics, but also because voting for them in the
European elections poses no risk for the voter. From this perspective the change
we propose would increase voters’ rationality when making their decision. The
key paradigm today for the European elections is voting with national criteria in
mind, thus rewarding or punishing the incumbent government. This indicates
that the European question has not been strengthened diachronically, despite
the obvious Europeanisation of the decision-making process. Furthermore,
today, voting for party A or party B in the European elections basically equates to
selecting candidates for the EP. If the selection of the national member of the
European Commission was added to this it would strongly increase the attention
paid by the voters to the real issue of the elections, that is, ‘who goes to
Brussels’. Selecting a few people from each party who will become a marginal
part of a several-hundred-member-strong institution has much less of an impact
than selecting who will be the one and only national representative in the
28-member European Commission. By having both issues decided at the ballot
box we can expect a significant increase in the rationality behind the voters’
decision-making processes. The authority and the legitimacy of the national
government would not be challenged by this proposal and would continue to
be reflected in the make-up of the Council and the European Council. The
Commission is the supranational institution and it is only right that it be linked
with the results of the European elections. This proposal would also further
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strengthen the independence of the commissioners from their national
governments as their appointment would be linked with the outcome of the
European elections.
Conclusion
The way the EU works has changed a lot in the past four decades. Particularly
with the launch of the co-decision procedure and its gradual extension to almost
all areas of decision-making, the cooperation of all the core institutions is critical
to the output of the Union. This is very different from the situation in the 1970s
or 1980s, when the Commission and the Council were legislating independently
of the EP, which was mainly a discussion forum. With the Lisbon Treaty, and
especially with the ongoing financial crisis in Europe, the debate about the core
European institutions remaining immune from and outside of continuous
political confrontation is relatively outdated. The EU is a federal union of states
with a high degree of unification in some domains but not in others. The
discussion and the decisions that need to be taken to continue the process of
unification should be carried out in an ideological and political way that
complements the intergovernmental character of the EU which already exists in
the Council and the European Council. This would offer opportunities and
benefits for those political organisations that can coordinate and consolidate
their representation in the core institutions across the EU. Although a
complicated exercise, this is the direction in which the European parties should
look to make a difference to policymaking in the EU.
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